Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals by Cross, Frank B & Tiller, Emerson H
Essay
Judicial Partisanship and Obedience
to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing
on the Federal Courts of Appeals
Frank B. Cross' and Emerson H. Tiller"
In traditional legal analysis, scholars take for granted the effect of Supreme
Court doctrine. Lower courts are presumed to adhere to the self-enforcing
principle of stare decisis and to apply the doctrines of higher courts to the
particular facts of the underlying case.' Precedent reputedly controls lower-
court decisions.2 Whether such obedience to legal doctrine occurs as routinely
as this analysis suggests, however, has not been adequately addressed in the
legal literature. Indeed, there are few empirical studies by legal scholars
bearing on the matter at all.' In this Essay, we go to the heart of the issue and
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I. The Supreme Court has declared that stare dectsis "is a basic self-governing principle within the
Judicial Branch." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 491 U.S. 164. 172 (1989).
2. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court-1991 Term. Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 64-65 (1992) (reporting the traditional postuon that "[ciourts are to stick
to law, judgment, and reason in making their decisions and should leave politics, will. and value choice
to others"). Archibald Cox refers to the "discipline of legal reasoning" as a means of "minmiz[ing] the
danger of writing [Justices'] personal values and preferences" into their opinions. ARCHLIBALD Cox. THE
COURT AND THE CONSIrunsoN 70 (1987). David Shapiro contends that requiring judges to give reasons
for their opinions serves "a vital function in constraining the judiciary's exereise of power." David L
Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731. 737 (1987). Chief Judge Harry Edwards
of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals states that "it is the law-and not the personal politics of individual
judges--that controls judicial decision-making in most cases resolved by the court of appeals." Harry T.
Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the
D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 619, 620 (1985).
3. See sources cited infra Section I.B for legal scholarship discussing judicial obedience to doctrine
in the context of administrative law. For studies on obedience within the judiciary, consider Richard L
Pacelle, Jr. & Lawrence Baum, Supreme Court Authority in the Judicia)'. 20 Am. POL Q. 169 (1992).
which concludes through a study of cases remanded by the Supreme Court that lower courts tend to
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ask the following question: If judges have personal or partisan policy
preferences, why would they follow established legal doctrine when it conflicts
with those preferences? While there is undoubtedly more than one valid
explanation for principled adherence to legal doctrine, we suggest that the
prospect of a "whistleblower" on the court-that is, the presence of a judge
whose policy preferences differ from the majority's and who will expose the
majority's manipulation or disregard of the applicable legal doctrine (if such
manipulation or disregard were needed to reach the majority's preferred
outcome)-is a significant determinant of whether judges will perform their
designated role as principled legal decisionmakers. We do more than merely
propose this theory; we test it empirically and find substantial support for our
claim.
To be sure, legal doctrine endorsed by the Supreme Court plays a critical
role in the decisionmaking of federal jurists, and it would be an overstatement
to claim that most judges casually disregard doctrine when it stands in the way
of reaching their desired policy outcome. Nonetheless, much of the scholarship
simply assumes the sincere application of legal doctrine without considering
the possibility that it may at times be nothing more than a convenient
rationalization for political decisionmaking.4 Indeed, many legal scholars
explicitly discard the proposition that judges disregard legal doctrine in favor
of partisan or ideological policymaking, or ignore the proposition with silent
disdain, even in the face of reputable empirical studies in political science
demonstrating the existence of such subversions of legal precedent and
doctrine.5
The traditional position has been challenged by legal realists, critical legal
scholars, and political scientists, who are all highly skeptical of the practical
importance of legal doctrine. They contend, and empirically demonstrate, that
judges often decide cases according to their political proclivities and use
recognize high-court authority; and Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal.
Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Am. J. POL. Sci. 673 (1994), which reaches
mixed conclusions regarding the effect of Supreme Court precedent on circuit court behavior.
4. But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the
District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence ofAgency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE LJ. 300, 303-07
(surveying a set of administrative law cases in the D.C. Circuit and concluding that the decisions are best
explained by the policy predilections of individual judges and by whether a majority of the judges on a
panel were appointed by a Republican or a Democratic president).
5. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING To DECIDE: AGENDA SE'rING IN THE UNrrED STATES SUPREME
COURT 4 (1991) (reporting that legal scholars "ignore with impunity" the empirical research on political
decisionmaking by judges); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 4 (1994) (discussing the reluctance of legal scholars to consider the empirical findings
of political scientists). The assumption of the importance of doctrine in judicial decisions is so strong that
some commentators have criticized the Supreme Court for paying too much attention to precedent in its
decisions. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 422,426-27 (1988) (criticizing reliance on precedent in statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988) (same).
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precedent, if at all, as an ex post facto justification for their decisions.6 This
scholarship challenges the presumption that judges follow the law out of a
sense of responsibility or role orientation. While the Supreme Court can
theoretically play a disciplining role by enforcing adherence to doctrine on
appeal, the Court's limited resources may preclude effective control.7
According to the attitudinal model, lower-court obedience to legal doctrine has
little practical effect in determining judicial decisions!
Just as practitioners of the traditional position have ignored political
variables, those in the other camp (legal realists, critical legal scholars, and
political scientists) have paid little heed to the role legal doctrine might play
in judicial decisionmaking. 9 Indeed, many of their claims of political
decisionmaking fail to incorporate any legal variables.'0 For the most part,
these scholars stand steadfast in the belief that the explanatory value of legal
6. Among the most prominent presentations of this position is JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATITrUDINAL MODEL (1993). in which the authors claim that
virtually all Supreme Court decisions are determined by the Justices' polities rather than the law. See ad.
at 72-73. The authors present considerable empirical evidence to this effect, showing that Justices' votes
can be predicted based on their political attitudes as revealed in prior decisions. See id. at 255. As for
decisions relying on precedent, the authors claim that "opinions containing such rules merely rationalize
decisions; they are not the causes of them." Id. at 66. Such rationalization comes rather easily, as
precedents are typically available on both sides of any case. See. e.g., Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J.
Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal
Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 206 (1984) (presenting the Critical Legal Studies view that "Illegal
doctrine can be manipulated to justify an almost infinite spectrum of possible outcomes").
7. See, e.g., Peter L Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 CoLUM. L REv. 1093. 1095 (1987)
(observing that "the Court's awareness (of] how infrequently it is able to review lower court decisions has
led it to be tolerant, even approving, of lower court and party indiscipline in relation to existing law").
Several rational choice models of judicial review of agency decisionmaking have incorporated the notion
that actors have limited resources and the derivative proposition that this creates discretion for agencies and
lower courts. See Pablo T. Spiller, Agency Discretion Under Judicial Review. 16 MA-IHE.MAICAL &
COMPUTER MODELING 185 (1992) (modeling the role of decision costs in creating discretion for agencies);
Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Admnstrative Process
and Judicial Review, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (1997) (discussing the ability of Congress to manipulate the
resources of agencies and courts for purposes of achieving policies desired by Congress); Emerson H.
Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling Process, 14 J.L ECON. & ORG. 114 (1998) (modeling the ability
of a court to manipulate agency resources to achieve a policy desired by the coun); Joseph L. Smith &
Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal) (testing empirically models of strategic choice by circuit
courts); Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Polities and Decision Costs in
Administrative and Judicial Process (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal)
(modeling the ability of agencies and courts strategically to select grounds upon which to base a decision
in order to impose costs upon reviewing actors).
8. A leading political scientist and lawyer claims that the "evidence overwhelmingly supports the
attitudinal model and, equally overwhelmingly, fails to support the legal model as an explanation of why
the justices decide their cases as they do." Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, an CO,1TE.%tIPATNG
CoURTs 296, 296 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995). He emphasizes that "the mere fact that a court cites precedent
provides no evidence that precedent actually determines the outcome of the case." Id. at 302.
9. Perry suggests that political scientists show a "lack of appreciation of the nature of the courts, the
law, and the legal system." PERRY, supra note 5, at 3.
10. See Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial
Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL Sct. 963. 967 (1992) (reporting that
"scholars in the empirical tradition have given little systematic attention to the potential effect of variables
that might reflect the traditional model").
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variables is at best not capable of being tested or, as is more likely,
nonexistent."1
The battle over the significance of doctrine has persisted without truly
being joined. Traditional legal scholars have assiduously guarded their
disciplinary turf against outsiders as have those promoting the more cynical
explanations of judicial decisionmaking. In this Essay, we fuse the various
judicial decisionmaking models of political scientists and legal scholars to
explain and demonstrate empirically under what conditions appellate court
judges do obey the legal doctrines the Supreme Court has set out. We examine
this proposition in the context of administrative law, where the Supreme Court
has laid down a reputedly path-breaking legal doctrine governing judicial
review of administrative agencies. We ask whether, and under what conditions,
appellate courts adhere to this command.
I. A THEORY OF COMPLIANCE WITH DOCTRINE
Once the Supreme Court sets forth doctrines, lower courts may comply or
disobey. If lower courts comply, they may do so for a number of reasons: (1)
compliance with doctrine enables the lower courts to effect their political
preferences; 2 (2) the lower courts are dutifully performing their roles as
sincere jurists, applying the principles in an ideologically (or politically)
neutral manner;13 or (3) the lower courts fear exposure of any noncompliance
and consequent reversal. Lower courts may disobey because (4) they wish to
effect their political preferences; 4 or (5) they mean to apply doctrine dutifully
but are influenced to apply the rules in a way that achieves their political
I1. Segal and Spaeth complain that the legal model cannot be objectively operationalized in an
empirical study. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6, at 33-34. They have recently sought to test the legal
model by examining whether Supreme Court Justices followed precedents from which they initially
dissented. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United
States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL. Sct. 971 (1996). While they found that dissenters continued
to dissent, notwithstanding the creation of the original precedent, see id. at 971, this finding hardly
disproves the legal model. That model does not dictate that Justices must follow a precedent they believe
to be contrary to the Constitution.
12. In this circumstance, the legal and political models are mutually reinforcing.
13. This is the conventional legal model. For a discussion, see Frank B. Cross, Political Science and
the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 255-
63 (1997).
14. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (discussing how the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation decisions are restrained
by the risk of being overridden by subsequent legislation); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive
Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1631, 1643-44 (1995) (claiming that
lower courts restrain their rulings so as to avoid higher-court reversal). But cf. Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson
H. Tiller, Invitations To Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT'L REV.
L. & EcON. 503 (1996) (illustrating how the Supreme Court may prod Congress into reversing one of its
decisions to maximize the Court's doctrinal and policy preferences).
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preferences.1 5 Each of these five modes may operate at different times and
under different circumstances.'
6
Our first theoretical proposition is simple: Judges are more likely to obey
legal doctrine when such doctrine supports the partisan or ideological policy
preferences of the court majority. In those cases in which doctrine does not
support the partisan or ideological policy preferences of the court majority, we
expect somewhat more disobedience. Our second theoretical proposition is that
courts are more likely to comply with doctrine (rather than to decide based
solely on their political preferences) when the judicial panel is politically or
ideologically divided. This results from the presence of a minority position on
the panel that creates an opportunity for whistleblowing-a minority member
with doctrine on her side and the ability, through a dissent, to expose
disobedient decisionmaking by the majority. The minority member may
threaten to highlight the disobedience externally to a higher court or to
Congress, producing exposure and possible reversal. 7 Alternatively, the
minority may expose the subconscious disobedience internally, causing the
majority to acknowledge its disregard or unintentional manipulation of
doctrine. Consequently, in the presence of such a whistleblower, the majority
must sometimes capitulate and keep its decision within the confines of
doctrine.
We apply our analysis to the federal courts of appeals.' These courts are
15. Even the behavioralist political scientists who maintain that judges are acting politically do not
necessarily claim that these actions are consciously disobedient to legal doctrine. See C.K. Rowland, The
Federal District Courts, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRrITCAL ASSESSMENr 61. 79 (John B. Gates &
Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (observing that judges of different ideologies "will often see similar
evidence differently, remember evidence that fits their relevant mental constructs more vividly and
accurately than evidence that does not, and interpret ambiguous information in ways consistent with their
schematic predilections"); see also Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor. 73 TEx. L.
REV. 1307, 1318-19 (1995) (indicating that "Im]any omissions of candor. after all. are not conscious ploys
on the part of judges, but rather the product of either less-than-thorough or genuinely self-deceptive
analysis").
16. It is also possible that a lower court tried to apply the doctrine dutifully but misunderstood that
doctrine as it was intended by the Supreme Court. We do not consider this a disobedience of doctrine in
our analysis.
17. For an example of a case in which a minority judge (Democrat) chided the majority (Republicans)
for not following doctrine, see Engine Manufacturers Ass'n v. EPA. 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996). which
involved an industry association's challenge to an EPA rule where a Republican panel majority vacated one
section of the regulation. The lone Democrat dissented, arguing that the Chevron doctrine, see Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). should have required
approval of the entire rule. For the role of dissent more generally, consider a recent study on search-and-
seizure cases suggesting that dissents are driven in part by the ideological preferences of judges. See Steven
R- Van Winkle, Dissent as a Signal: Evidence from the U.S. Courts of Appeals (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal) (finding dissents more likely to occur on a circuit court
panel when the dissenter was of the same ideological position as the full circuit majonty, thus suggesting
a political whistleblowing effect).
18. The approach taken here is consistent with the recent law and positive political theory movement.
which has addressed questions of constitutional law, federalism, administrative law, statutory interpretation,
and judicial expansion through rational choice and institutional theory. See. e.g., Jenna Bednar & William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism.
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995) (analyzing the variance in Supreme Court federalism decisions through
the insights of positive political theory); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L Spitzer. Judicial Deference to
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organized such that three-judge panels are randomly selected to hear appeals
from lower federal district courts or federal regulatory agencies. After these
panels make their decisions, the outcome may be appealed to the full circuit
sitting en banc or to the Supreme Court. Figure 1 illustrates the likelihood that
the panel follows established doctrine given the alignment of preferences
within the judicial panel (measured by either party affiliation of the judges or
some other independent measure of judicial preferences) and the consistency
Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL L. REV. 431 (1996) (using
insights of positive political theory to predict when the Supreme Court will manipulate administrative law);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article L Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992)
(analyzing Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution through the lens of positive political theory as a
"sequential game" consisting of interactions among the branches based on their individual preferences);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Ordinal Constitutional
Structure of Lawmaking in the Modem Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON & ORG. 165 (1992) (applying game-
theoretical work in positive political theory to find a more systematic basis for evaluating Supreme Court
constitutional decisions regarding the lawmaking functions of agencies); John M. de Figuciredo & Emerson
H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the
Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & ECON. 435 (1996) (using positive political theory to explain the expansion
of the federal judiciary as a product of unified government); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational
Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City
Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263, 265 (1990) (using positive political theory models to illustrate that "(t]he
ability of other political actors ... to reverse the Supreme Court ... is what constrains the scope and
power of the Court"); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (using positive political theory to examine how interest groups
monitor agency compliance with congressional directives); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA.
L. REv. 431 (1989) (same); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, LAW & CoNTEmp. PRoBs., winter 1994, at 3 (proposing the use of positive
political theory as a descriptive model of the legislative process to clarify statutory intent); McNollgast,
supra note 14, at 1631 (using positive political theory to explain adherence to doctrine and court packing);
McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO L.J.
705 (1992) (advocating the use of positive political theory to attain a clearer understanding of statutory
intent); Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, J.L. ECON. & ORO., Special
Issue 1990, at 213, 230 (using institutional theory to explain how administrative procedure is traded for
substance in a way that "public agencies will tend to be structured in part by their enemies-who want
them to fall"); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership
in the Modem Administrative State, 43 DUKE LJ. 1180 (1994) (considering the role of the President in
regulatory reform through an analysis informed by positive political theory); Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael
Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-
Relations Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992) (using positive political theory to analyze
the conditions under which the Supreme Court may impose its policy preferences on the Constitution
without risking being overruled by constitutional amendment); Pablo T. Spiller & Matthew L. Spitzer.
Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 8 (1992) (using positive political theory to
suggest why the Supreme Court will use constitutional rather than statutory interpretation in a strategic
game with Congress). For some comments on and criticisms of these various approaches, see Linda R.
Cohen, Politics and the Courts: A Comment on McNollgast, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1685 (1995); Murray J.
Hom & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies": Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs,
75 VA. L. REv. 499 (1989); Jack Knight, Positive Models and Normative Theory: A Comment on Eskridge
and Ferejohn, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 190 (1992); Glen 0. Robinson, Commentary on Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies: Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L.
REv. 483 (1989); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Administrative State and the Original Understanding:
Comments on Eskridge and Ferejohn, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 197 (1992); Peter L. Strauss & Andrew R.
Rutten, The Game of Politics and Law: A Response to Eskridge and Ferejohn, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 205
(1992); and Emerson H. Tiller, Putting Politics into the Positive Political Theory of Federalism: A
Comment on Bednar and Eskridge, 68 S. CAL L REv. 1493 (1995).
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of these preferences with the outcome dictated by adhering to doctrine. The
alignment numbers (3-0 and 2-1) do not necessarily indicate the actual voting
of the judges (since compromises may be made among the panel members);
the numbers indicate only the underlying policy preference alignments of the
panel members.
FIGURE 1. LIKELIHOOD THAT DOCTRINE Is FOLLOWED
GIVEN THE JUDICIAL PANEL'S POLICY ALIGNMENTS
3-0 partisan-aligned panel 2-I partisan-split panel where 3-0 partisan-aligned and 2-I
where doctrine does not doctrine does not support the policy-splil panels where
support the panel's majority's assumed policy doctrine supports the majority's
assumed policy position position assumed policy position
Low High
Likelihood of Following Legal Doctrine
Figure 1 suggests that if the policy favored by the majority of the members
on the panel would be accomplished through adherence to the applicable legal
doctrine-that is, when there is convergence between sincere application of the
doctrine and the policy preferences of the majority-then that panel will be
more likely to follow the doctrine than if convergence did not exist. In such
a case, legal doctrine is not a constraint upon the pursuance of policy goals;
instead, it helps to legitimize the policy outcome of the unified panel. In
contrast, if the three members of the panel are unified in their policy
preferences and if they would not benefit from sincere application of the
doctrine-that is, there is no convergence between the majority's policy
preferences and the sincere application of doctrine-then they would be more
likely to ignore doctrine. If the members of the panel are divided two-to-one
in their policy preferences, however, and if the minority member's policy
preferences converge with the application of doctrine while the majority's
preferences do not, the minority member could act as a whistleblower, forcing
the majority to follow the doctrine more often than if all three members were
unified against application of the doctrine. In this sense, doctrine does matter
because it is a real constraint upon the court majority's ability to pursue policy
goals.
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II. JUDICIAL OBEDIENCE TO THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE:
APPLYING THE THEORY TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,'9 seemingly commanded lower courts to grant considerable
deference to federal administrative agency interpretations of statutes. The
decision was of great import for administrative law and also offers an ideal test
case for determining whether Supreme Court doctrine has a material effect in
restraining the decisions of lower courts. One can examine lower-court
decisionmaking in the wake of Chevron and observe whether the lower court
is granting deference neutrally, as per doctrine, or is manipulating the
deference doctrine to achieve politically desirable outcomes. We employ
Chevron cases to test our theories of judicial decisionmaking. First, however,
some background on Chevron and its interpretation is necessary.
A. The Terms of Chevron
Chevron arose from a creative statutory interpretation by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that modified the definition of a
pollution source to enhance the efficiency of control measures. The rule was
challenged by environmentalists and struck down by the D.C. Circuit,2" which
found the EPA's interpretation of the statute contrary to congressional intent.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the D.C. Circuit and, in the process,
set forth what has become known as the Chevron doctrine of deference to
agency statutory interpretations.
On its face, Chevron analysis provides for a two-step inquiry. First, a
judge must determine if "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue."'2' If so, the agency must adhere to the unambiguous legislative
command, and a court may reverse a contrary agency interpretation. In
Chevron itself, the Court found the statutory language ambiguous and the
legislative history silent.22 If the congressional directive is ambiguous, a court
is to move on to the second analytical step-whether the agency's
interpretation of ambiguity is reasonable.' This reasonableness standard has
been analogized to the purportedly deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard
of review.24
19. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
20. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub
nom. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
21. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
22. See id. at 862.
23. See id. at 843-44. Reasonableness in the Chevron case was found in part because of the agency's
need to reconcile "conflicting policies." Id. at 865.
24. See Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
821, 827 (1990); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
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While the general thrust of Chevron is deference to administrative agency
interpretations, the opinion did not command mechanistic deference. A lower
court can refuse to defer because the agency interpretation is contrary to the
plain meaning of the statute (step one) or because the interpretation is
unreasonable (step two).25 A court striking down a rule on these grounds can
claim to be obedient to doctrine. Thus obedience to doctrine cannot be
measured strictly by the amount of deference given to agencies. Nonetheless,
legal commentators considered Chevron to represent "a watershed
administrative law ruling that would encourage reviewing courts to defer to
agency interpretations and policy directions. ' 'a6 The decision reputedly made
"fundamental alterations... in our constitutional conception of the
administrative state," 27 "revolutionized judicial review of agency statutory
interpretation,"' represents "one of the most important decisions in the
history of administrative law, '2 9  and constitutes (because Chevron is
considered by some to be the counter-Marbury v. Madison" for the
administrative state) "a pillar in administrative law for many years to
come."3' In short, most thought that Chevron would result in greater
deference by the judiciary to administrative agency decisions.
Many commentators criticized the Supreme Court's approach. Some
emphasized the judicial province over saying what the law is and objected
to the Court's abandonment of this authority.32 This effect may disrupt the
Constitution's separation of powers, unduly weakening the judicial check and
transferring excessive control to the President33 or to the bureaucracy
25. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
26. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE LJ. 984, 991; see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy. Judicial
Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions. 44 DUKE L.J. 1051. 105 I
(1995) (reporting that "[a]dministrative law scholars, whether they agreed or disagreed with the Court's
standards, assumed that [Chevron and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass 'n %, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)] were landmark decisions that signaled a turning point in the substantive
review of agency decisions").
27. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State.
89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 456 (1989).
28. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Dectsionmaking in Reviewing
Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L REv. 83, 84 (1994).
29. 1 KENNE- CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.2. at
110 (3d ed. 1994).
30. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
31. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron. 90 COLU.I. L REv. 2071. 2075 (1990).
32. See, e.g., Cornell W. Clayton, Separate Branches-Separate Politics: Judicial Enforcement of
Congressional Intent, 109 POL. Sci. Q. 843, 871 (1994-1995) (arguing that the Chevron approach "should
cause great concern for those committed to the rule of law"); see also Michael Herz, Deference Running
Riot. Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron. 6 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 187. 189 (1992)
(noting that "[i]ts detractors portray Chevron as ... abandon[ing] to administrative agencies the judicial
authority and obligation to 'say what the law is"').
33. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 27, at 498 (claiming that if "Congress chooses to delegate regulatory
authority to agencies, part of the price of delegation may be that the court, not the agency, must hold the
power to say what the statute means"); Abner S. Greene. Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 123, 123 (1994) (explaining that when the President executes a law that
is "vague or silent on a key issue ... the resulting rule-from either rulemaking or adjudication-is a
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itself. 4 One critic questioned the basis for deference in political theory,
suggesting that judicial restraint could lead to the maintenance of policies
contrary to the public interest.35 Other commentators, however, have
defended Chevron, arguing that courts should restrain themselves from
intervening in fundamentally political decisions made by more accountable
administrative agencies.36 An active approach to judicial review "allows
judges to rely on their personal politics to decide statutory issues. 37
Additionally, commentators have argued, courts should defer to the greater
experience and expertise of agencies regarding the statutes they
administer.38
Regardless of the merits of Chevron, its two-step procedure creates a
loophole through which disobedient courts may advance their policy
preferences at the expense of sincere application of doctrine. A court that
dislikes the outcome of an agency decision can declare that the interpretation
is contrary to plain statutory meaning and still claim obedience to doctrine.39
This loophole enables a lower court to "transform Chevron from a deference
doctrine to a doctrine of antideference. ' '40 Indeed, the two-step test can be a
recipe for disobedience, simultaneously providing a command of deference and
showing lower courts how to evade it.4'
policy choice in much the same way that statutes are policy choices").
34. See Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative
Power, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 295, 296 (1987).
35. See Seidenfeld, supra note 28, at 104-1I.
36. See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?:
A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L. RIxv.
1275, 1289; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking:
Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 481, 484-87 (1990).
37. Seidenfeld, supra note 28, at 116.
38. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363
(1986); John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 311 (1990); Daniel
B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 122 (1994);
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 519.
39. From our sample of cases, consider American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1995), in which the majority decided not to engage in Chevron deference but instead used Chevron as
authority for not deferring. In that case, petitioners, a group of petroleum manufacturers and refiners,
challenged an EPA rule in which the EPA had broadly interpreted its power under various environmental
statutes to mandate the use of renewable oxygenates in its regulations for the reformulated gasoline program
under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994). The thre-judge panel, all Republican appointees,
ruled against the EPA and held for the petroleum trade associations. See American Petroleum Inst., 52 F.3d
at 1115. Relying on the "plain meaning" of the statute, the panel stated that the statute was quite clear
about what the EPA could consider in promulgating the rule and that the EPA had overstepped the
boundaries of the statute. The panel made this finding in spite of statutory language stating that the agency
could consider impacts on cost, energy requirements, and other health and environmental impacts and that
the EPA had the authority to promulgate such regulations as are necessary for it to carry out its functions
under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7545(k)(1), 7601(a)(1). Moreover, the statute did not explicitly limit those
regulations to implementing emission or other particular standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(1). The panel,
nonetheless, chose against deference, stating that "step one" of the Chevron test dictated the outcome.
American Petroleum Inst., 52 F.3d at I 119.
40. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 992 (1992).
41. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 26, at 1069-70 (claiming that the Chevron doctrine is
indeterminate and allows for an open-ended interpretation of its meaning by lower courts).
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When examining an individual opinion striking down a rule, it can be
difficult to identify disobedience. The opinion will justify its nondeference
through reference to statutory language, legislative history, and doctrine itself.
While one may disagree with the rationale and even question its sincerity, it
is impossible to demonstrate conclusively that any particular opinion's rationale
for nondeference is insincere or disobedient. Nevertheless, the opinion may be
disobedient, as conclusive demonstrations of sincerity are also lacking. By
looking at a pattern of cases, we strive to test for disobedience.
B. The Political Investigation of Chevron
The legal model implies that Chevron established a neutral principle
commanding appellate courts to defer to administrative statutory interpretations
and assumes that the courts will adhere faithfully to this command. The initial
approach in legal scholarship to Chevron tracked this model and analyzed
Chevron in terms of legal process values. Such analysis, though sensitive to
the practical political consequences of Chevron deference, generally ignored
the prospect that the courts might manipulate Chevron for political effect.
Indeed, both critics and defenders assumed that Chevron would have
significant effects on judicial behavior, as the legal model predicted. A leading
defender of judicial deference suggested that Chevron had "transformed
dramatically the approach taken by courts in reviewing agency interpretations
of statutory provisions."4 2 Few authors considered the possibility that the
doctrinal principles of Chevron might have little real world impact, 3 though
one commentator recently suggested that a new "hypertextualism" in judicial
statutory interpretation has undermined the deference that the Chevron Court
intended.44
While legal research has typically ignored the politics of doctrinal
evolution, Chevron has been something of an exception to the rule. At least
two significant empirical studies have considered the role of Chevron in
appellate decisionmaking.45 These studies have explicitly acknowledged the
claims of legal realism and political science regarding judicial decisionmaking.
42. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301. 302 (1988). Pierce has subsequently suggested that the effect
of Chevron has dissipated somewhat over time. See Richard J. Pierce. Jr.. Legislative Reform of Judicial
Review of Agency Actions, 44 DuKE L.J. 1110. 1112 (1995) Ihereinafter Pierce. Legislative Reform].
Nonetheless, he believes that the "Chevron test has largely realized its potential at the circuit court level.-
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hyperrextuahsm: An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 749 (1995).
43. For a rare exception, see Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron. 58 MO. L REv. 129.
130 (1993).
44. Pierce, Legislative Reform, supra note 42. at 1123. Pierce focused this cnticism on the Supreme
Court's, rather than the appellate courts', application of Chevron.
45. A third study considered the Supreme Court's use of its Chevron precedent. See Merrill, supra note
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The first major Chevron study was performed by Peter Schuck and Donald
Elliott.46 The authors studied several aspects of the decision, including its
effect on appellate court decisionmaking. They hypothesized that "[i]f the
Court meant what it said in Chevron and its progeny, and if reviewing courts
took its words seriously, one would expect the distribution of outcomes in
agency cases to reflect the effects of Chevron. 47 Specifically, "one would
expect the courts to affirm more frequently and to remand less frequently."4
Schuck and Elliot tested for the relative rate of affirmances immediately after
Chevron. As realists, the authors were at least somewhat doubtful of this
effect.
49
Schuck and Elliott found that in the immediate wake of Chevron, appellate
court remands and reversals declined, and the proportion of those remands and
reversals grounded in substantive interpretation of the law declined even more
pronouncedly. 50 This result, they claimed, contradicted the prediction of the
law skeptics and suggested that Chevron had a distinct effect on lower-court
decisions. These post-Chevron results were statistically significant.
Schuck and Elliott examined similar appellate results occurring three years
later and found that affirmance rates had begun to creep back down toward
(but not as low as) pre-Chevron levels.5' They tentatively attributed the
change to the Supreme Court's becoming slightly less deferential to agency
constructions. While one can imagine a variety of reasons for this result, the
authors suggested "the tantalizing hypothesis that over a large number of cases
the results of judicial review may be far more sensitive to subtle changes in
legal doctrine than we had anticipated."52 This study, therefore, offers some
support for the legal model of judicial decisionmaking that considers appellate
judges to be responsive to changes in doctrine.
Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer undertook the second major empirical
Chevron study in tandem with a major theoretical analysis, again informed
somewhat by legal realism. 53 While acknowledging that Schuck and Elliott
were "almost certainly correct" in claiming a Chevron-effect on appellate
courts,54 they made rather trenchant criticisms of Schuck and Elliott's
46. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 26.
47. Id. at 1026.
48. Id.
49. The authors note that strong law skeptics would claim that "doctrinal changes such as Chevron
should not affect the pattern of results reached in subsequent cases by lower courts, provided that the
judges' personal and political predilections remain essentially unchanged during the period under study."
Id. at 1029.
50. See id at 1030, 1033.
51. See id. at 1038.
52. Id. Schuck and Elliott conceded, however, that the results may be attributable to "the passage of
time, other changes in legal doctrine, the changing composition of the judiciary, or some other confounding
factor." Id.
53. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65.
54. Id. at 90.
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approach. First, they observed that Schuck and Elliott considered the rates of
substantive statutory remands, but not reversals or affirmances, and did not
even "indicate how many statutory constructions were upheld.""5 Second, they
noted that changes in results may have had nothing to do with the judiciary
itself but may have reflected an adjustment by administrative agencies or their
challengers.56
Cohen and Spitzer also considered the overall rate at which appellate
courts upheld agency interpretations and found "a slight increase in the
appellate affirm rate in the mid-1980s," though the increase was somewhat
smaller than that found by Schuck and Elliott.5 7 They also considered
contemporaneous Supreme Court certiorari and merits decisions involving
judicial review of administrative decisions. This review led to a rational choice
conclusion that the (conservative) Supreme Court slowly but steadily approved
a higher level of judicial agency supervision as the appellate courts became
relatively more conservative.5 They implied that the Supreme Court rather
precisely titrates the amount of deference due agencies (given the political
circumstances) and that the appellate courts respond. In short, Cohen and
Spitzer argued that appellate courts are responsive to the Supreme Court's
doctrinal decisions, though their analysis was grounded more in political
science than in the traditional legal model.
The Cohen-Spitzer study, as well as the Schuck-Elliott study, have been
cited as evidence that Chevron "marked a major change in administrative
law.' 59 The studies, however, were recently reviewed and reanalyzed by
Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy.60 Their data suggest that Chevron had
relatively little effect upon appellate court decisions, as the affirmance rate
between 1988 and 1990 was actually lower than the rate before Chevron."'
Chevron's doctrinal indeterminacy, Shapiro and Levy argue, has empowered
appellate courts to render essentially political, outcome-oriented decisions.6 -
Thus, ironically, an analysis of two studies generally concluding that appellate
courts respond to Supreme Court doctrine (though for different reasons) led to
the conclusion that appellate courts do not so respond. Plainly, the
consequences of the Supreme Court's Chevron holding remain uncertain.
Our research builds upon this existing body of empirical work in the hopes
of clarifying the issue. We limit our analysis to statutory interpretation of cases
55. Id. at 91.
56. See idL
57. Id. at 103. One problem recognized by the authors was that their database "included all
administrative decisions, rather than just those that addressed statutory interpretation cases." Id.
58. See id. at 105.
59. Seidenfeld, supra note 28, at 84 n.5.
60. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 26, at 1070-7 1.
61. See id. This conclusion is somewhat uncertain, as it depends on comparing data from the Schuck-
Elliott study with data from the Cohen-Spitzer study. even though the two studies used somewhat different
sources of data.
62. See id. at 1053.
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explicitly invoking Chevron, rather than looking at all administrative law
opinions. We also consider the political orientations of the judges and match
them with outcomes, focusing less on the overall frequency of deference and
more on the patterns of applying that deference by ideological outcome.
II[. AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION
We reviewed all opinions from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals between
1991 and 1995 that cited Chevron-according to Shepard's Citations, over two
hundred in all. Cases that cited Chevron for something other than the deference
principle were excluded. Each case was then coded for, among other things,
(1) whether the court gave deference to the agency statutory interpretation; (2)
whether the court upheld or reversed the agency policy;63 (3) the direction of
the policy outcome (liberal vs. conservative) from the agency; and (4) the
partisan makeup of the court panel (Democrats vs. Republicans).
With respect to policy direction, our coding tracked practices relatively
common in the political science literature.64 If an industry group was
challenging a federal regulation, then the agency position was coded as liberal.
If nongovernmental public interest organizations or individual plaintiffs
challenged the agency position, we coded the agency position as conservative,
unless the organization or individual was clearly conservative in orientation,
in which case we coded the agency position as liberal. Cases without any clear
political content were winnowed from the database, leaving about 170
decisions coded. If the court reversed the agency in favor of a liberal
challenger, we coded the case outcome as liberal; if the court reversed the
agency in favor of a conservative challenger, we coded the outcome as
conservative.
With respect to coding the preferences of the reviewing court panel, each
judge was assigned a political party affiliation according to the President who
appointed the judge. We assumed that, in general, Democratic appointees are
more liberal and Republicans more conservative in policy orientation. During
the time period under consideration, the D.C. Circuit was dominated by
Republican appointees, although a significant number of Democratic appointees
were present. Each panel therefore had a majority (2-1 or 3-0) of either
Republican or Democratic judges. This coding enabled us to test whether the
partisanship of the judicial panel influenced the political outcomes of litigation
and the degree to which Chevron deference affected this association.
63. This coding required some subjective judgment, as administrative law cases commonly mise a
variety of discrete issues. If the court upheld the challenge to agency action in any substantial part and
granted the challenger a significant measure of the relief sought, the case was coded as upholding the
challenge. In a handful of cases where the court deferred on statutory interpretation, yet reversed on other
grounds, the case was coded as upholding the challenge.
64. See Cross, supra note 13, at 290-91.
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A simple comparison of judicial party affiliation and political decisions
reveals a fairly profound partisan effect. Table 1 displays the political results
of cases according to the makeup of the deciding panel of judges. Each cell
contains the absolute number of cases.
TABLE 1. POLITICS AND JUDICIAL OUTCOMES
REPUBLICAN DiIOcRAnc TOTALS
MAJORITY I MAJORITY I
CONSERVATIVE CASE OUTCOME 62 13 75
LIBERAL CASE OUTCOME 52 28 80
TOTALS 114 41 155
Thus, a panel consisting of a majority of Republicans rendered a conservative
decision 54% of the time (62 of 114), while a panel consisting of a majority
of Democrats rendered a liberal decision 68% of the time (28 of 41). The
presence of some "liberal" decisions by conservative courts and "conservative"
decisions by liberal courts may be a function of a combination of factors. It
may be a misspecification problem--politics lie upon a continuum, and some
policies may be too conservative for a given "conservative" court or too liberal
for a "liberal" court. Or, our coding of agency decisions by nature of the
litigant challenging the agency may misidentify some litigants' political
affiliations. Alternatively, the mismatch may indicate that doctrine is having
a significant effect in constraining all-out partisan decisionmaking.
Nonetheless, these simple results suggest that there is a significant political
determinant to judicial decisionmaking, at least in Chevron review.
Our theory suggests that whether deference is granted (that is, whether the
Chevron doctrine is being adhered to) is dependent upon the convergence
between the partisan policy preferences of the panel's majority and the
outcome resulting from the application of Chevron. Put differently, the court
panel is more likely to follow Chevron when the agency has issued a policy
consistent with the panel's assumed policy preferences (liberal for Democrats
and conservative for Republicans) than when there is no such alignment
between the court's policy preferences and the agency policy. To bear out this
relationship and to sort out the effects of several other variables that may affect
the likelihood that a court will defer to an agency, we ran a statistical test.
Using logistic regression techniques, we specified the equation as follows:
DEFERENCE = INTERCEPT + B1POLICY CONVERGENCE
+ B2UNIFIED PANEL + B3MAJORITY
PARTY + B4YEAR + u,.
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POLICY CONVERGENCE is both the political variable and the main
variable of interest. It indicates whether there is alignment between the
assumed preferences of the panel's majority (as measured by the political party
affiliation of the majority of members on the panel) and the policy outcome of
the agency (as measured by the litigants challenging the agency). We postulate
that deference is more likely when the assumed partisan preferences of the
panel's majority favor the agency outcome (Republicans favoring conservative
agency outcomes and Democrats favoring liberal agency outcomes).
We also include a variable to indicate whether the reviewing panel
members were from the same political party (UNIFIED PANEL). Our theory
suggests that a politically unified panel, that is 3-0 Republican or 3-0
Democrat, is more likely to disregard the constraints of doctrines that do not
support the court's policy preferences when there is no policy convergence.
When there is no whistleblower on a panel, that is the panel is politically
unified, judges will see doctrine as less of an obstacle to political
decisionmaking.
Next, we include a variable for the political party of the majority of the
members on the panel (MAJORITY PARTY). It is possible that judges of one
party (for a variety of reasons, both political and sincere) are more true to legal
doctrine than the judges of the other.65 Finally, we include the variable
YEAR, which represents the actual year in which a particular case was
decided, the first year being set at zero. This is intended to capture the
possibility that the Chevron doctrine has grown weaker over time.
The results are set out in Table 2.
TABLE 2. RESULTS OF LOGIT
65. We also include this variable to offset any bias to measuring POLICY CONVERGENCE that may
result from the presence of a large number of Republican panels in the sample.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES COEFFICIENT [ (STANDARD ERROR)
INTERCEPT -140.246 (261.8195)
POLICY CONVERGENCE 1.4655"' (0.4233)
UNIFIED PANEL -0.7179' (0.4228)
MAJORrTY PARTY -0.3364 (0.4525)
YEAR 1.0706 (0.1313)
.p -< 0.I; - p _< 0.05; " p:5 0.01
Chi-square is 19.605 with 4 DF (p = 0.0006)
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As predicted, the effect of POLICY CONVERGENCE is properly
signed and highly significant. The results indicate that when the agency's
policy outcome is consistent with the policy preferences of the panel's
majority, the court is more likely to defer than if there is no such
convergence. We calculate the impact of this variable to be 31 %-that is,
the panel is 31% more likely to defer (that is, follow doctrine) when its
policy preferences are consistent with the agency's policies than when they
are not.66 The results also indicate that whether the panel was politically
divided (2-1) or united (3-0) had an effect on whether the panel deferred
to the agency, although the significance of these results is somewhat less
(p = 0.09). We calculated the impact of this variable to be 17c--that is,
it is 17% less likely that the court will defer when it is unified than when
it is split 2-1. Neither the political party of the panel majority (MAJORITY
PARTY) nor the year in which the decision was made (YEAR) proved
significant. In other words, neither Democrats nor Republicans appeared any
more or less committed to doctrine than judges of the other party.
Likewise, the passing of time did not appear to diminish or strengthen the
effects of Chevron.
While the above results suggest that a division among panel members
does affect whether doctrine will be followed (as indicated by the marginal
significance of the UNIFIED PANEL variable), they do not necessarily
establish that the presence of a whistleblower is the mechanism. It is
possible that 2-1 majorities whose policy preferences are consistent with
those of the agencies nonetheless decide, with some regularity, to capitulate
to the minority member. Recall that our whistleblower theory postulates
that there should be an effect when a 2-1 majority is in conflict (in terms
of its partisan policy preferences) with the agelicy over policy outcomes,
rather than when the 2-1 majority is in agreement with the agency's policy
choice.
To examine the whistleblower hypothesis further, we segregated the data
by whether there was a politically unified panel (3-0 Republican and 3-0
Democratic majorities) or politically divided panel (2-I Republican-to-
Democrat majorities and vice versa). We then separated the data with respect
to deference (our measure for judicial obedience) and whether there was policy
convergence between the deciding court panel and the agency. The data are
presented in Table 3.
66. The impact is computed by subtracting the probability of deference whcn POUCY
CONVERGENCE equals 0 from the probability of deference when the variable equals I. See generally TIM
FUTING LIAO, INTERPRETING PROBABILITY MODELS: LoGrr, PROBIT. AND OTMER GENERALIZED LINEAR
MODELS (Sage Univ. Papers Series, Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences No. 07-101, 1994).
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TABLE 3. POLITICS, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
UNIFIED PANEL DIVIDED PANEL TOTALS
POLICY No PoLIcY POLICY No PoLICY POLICY No POLICY
CONVERGE CONVERGE CONVERGE CONVERGES
1  
CONVERGE CONVERGE
DEFERENCE 10 7 37 47 47 54
No DEREENcE 4 14 7 29 It 43
TOTALS 14 21 44 76 58 97
Consider first the politically unified panels. In the 21 cases where it
appeared to be to the unified panels' policy advantage to disobey Chevron, the
panels did so two-thirds of the time. In other words, unified panels deferred
to the agency only 33% (7 of 21) of the time when the policy outcomes that
would have resulted from adhering to doctrine appeared inconsistent with the
panel's political preferences. In the 14 cases in which it appeared to be to the
advantage of the unified panels to obey Chevron, the panels did so 71% (10
of 14) of the time.
Now consider the divided panels. Of the cases in which it was to the
panels' advantage to obey Chevron, they did so 84% (37 of 44) of the time.
This is not surprising, as doctrine in such cases poses no conflict for the
majority. Now consider the 76 cases involving the whistleblower scenario, in
which it appeared to be to the advantage of the majority not to defer. These
panels continued to obey the doctrine 62% (47 of 76) of the time. Compare
this rate of obedience to that of unified panels whose policy preferences
seemed inconsistent with the application of the Chevron doctrine (33%). In
short, the presence of a whistleblower makes it almost twice as likely that
doctrine will be followed when doctrine works against the partisan policy
preferences of the court majority. These results are consistent with our theory
as illustrated in Figure 2.
To determine whether this whistleblower effect was statistically significant,
we ran a chi-square test. In running the test, we considered the subset of cases
in which application of the doctrine appeared to work against the majority's
policy preferences (essentially those cases for which the agency policy and the
panel majority's policy preferences were not aligned). The test indicated, at a
significance level of 0.05, that obedience to legal doctrine was not independent
of the presence of a whistleblower. In other words, the data indicate that the
presence of a whistleblower improves the chances that the court will apply the
applicable legal doctrine.68
67. This column indicates the whistleblowing scenario.
68. For purposes of symmetry, we also tested cases in which it was in the policy interest of the split-
panel majority to apply doctrine (that is, policy convergence existed). We looked at the inverse of the
whistleblower situation in particular--that is, we wanted to know if the presence of a divided panel
(regardless of policy convergence between the agency and the court) meant there would be a significant
change in the level of Chevron deference. This would suggest that majorities merely capitulate on occasion
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FIGURE 2. RATE THAT CHEVRON DOCTRINE WAS FOLLOWED
3-0 partisan-aligned panel 2-1 partisan-split panel 3-0 pactis-algned and 2-t
where doctrine does not where doctrine does not poltcy-splt panels where
support the panel's support the majority's doctrine supports the majority's




Rate of Deference (Adherence to Chevron)
IV. DISCUSSION
The data raise an intriguing question about decisions to grant deference:
Why does panel composition matter so dramatically? Circuit court decisions,
of course, are decided by majority vote. Consequently, a 2-1 majority has
every bit as much power to effect their partisan inclinations as does a 3-0
majority. Yet in practice, a 3-0 majority will be far more driven by
partisanship than a 2-1 majority. While the number of 3-0 Democrat panels is
too small to provide convincing results, the results on the Republican side are
dramatic. The presence of a single Democrat on a panel appears to have had
a distinct political moderating effect on the two Republicans. Republican
majorities still decided along partisan lines in a material subset of cases, but
the subset was clearly smaller than for politically unified panels.
The most likely explanation for the doctrine's impact on politically divided
panels is the whistleblower effect. The presence of a politically opposed
minority representative means that there is someone on the panel who can
identify the majority's disobedience to doctrine. A traditional rational choice
model might suggest that whistleblowing increases the risk of reversal by a
higher court or by Congress and that the possibility it might occur thus
dissuades judges from disobeying doctrine. On this theory, a minority judge's
stormy dissent enhances higher courts' external monitoring of judicial decisions
to minorities, not that the threat of exposure causes majorities to defy Chevron. A chi-square test suggested
that our whistleblower theory remained intact. There was no significant difference (p = 0.36) between a
divided panel and a unified panel in following doctrine when the application of Chevron would appear to
advance policy interests of the majority.
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by exposing the partisan biases of a majority that has ignored the dictates of
doctrine.69
While the increased possibility of reversal as a risk of whistleblowing may
well explain some decisions, there are reasons to suspect that the risk of
reversal is not always a threat to panel majorities. First, the Supreme Court can
review only a small fraction of the cases decided by circuit courts. 70 Congress
likewise has a considerable agenda of issues more pressing than reversing
typical statutory interpretation by a circuit court. Second, during the entire time
period of our study, the Supreme Court was majority Republican and relatively
conservative. Hence, if Supreme Court reversal was a risk, it should have been
a risk primarily for majority Democrat panels. One would not expect much
concern from Republican judges rendering conservative holdings. Yet
Republican panels often deferred to liberal agency interpretations. The risk of
reversal should be greater for Democrat panels, yet the evidence presented in
Table 1 demonstrates that such panels were, if anything, more partisan than
Republican panels.
If the risk of reversal cannot explain doctrinal adherence in divided panels,
the dynamics of panels themselves are likely to explain whistleblowing. The
minority member in such panels may simply force the majority to acknowledge
its subconscious disobedience to doctrine and therefore to mend its ways. The
collegiality and collaborative decisionmaking of multi-judge panels could
largely explain such a result.7' This theory is consistent with a recent study
of the federal district courts, which found that judges are committed to the
neutral operation of the legal model of decisionmaking but that the operation
of that model is influenced and biased by differing evaluations of evidence and
argument.72 Judges employ "cognitive shortcuts to process imperfect
information" under the legal model, and these shortcuts produce apparently
political results.73 In short, on multi-judge panels, the minority judge can
serve as a whistleblower by revealing these biasing cognitive shortcuts. Once
the majority can no longer readily rationalize its decision under the legal
model, it will frequently concede to the commands of that model.
69. See ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 179-82 (2d ed. 1991)
(suggesting that individual judges can influence the panel majority by threatening to go public with a
dissent).
70. See Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 137 (1980)
(concluding based on a study "that, if constraints operate on judges, these constraints must come from
sources other than possibilities of reversal"); Strauss, supra note 7, at 1096 (noting the Supreme Court's
limited power of supervision).
71. Two political scientists who generally subscribe to an attitudinal model of decisionmaking
acknowledge that most judges "can be swayed by an articulate and well-reasoned argument from a
colleague with a differing opinion." CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 69, at 176.
72. See C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLMCS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
(1996).
73. Id. at 171.
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There remain two other explanations for why judges sometimes grant
deference to agency interpretations contrary to their politics. Consider first a
split panel with two Republicans and one Democrat. With only two
Republicans on the panel, an issue might be a higher priority to one of the
Republicans than to the other, and the less interested judge would be more
likely to defer to the agency than if both other judges were Republicans who
favored nondeference. Yet this does not seem to be a politically logical
explanation, even given the possibility of judicial logrolling. One would expect
the Republican who did not care about the issue to defer to the Republican
who did care about the issue, in anticipation of complementary deference when
their roles were reversed. The judge generally has more to gain from deferring
to a colleague than from deferring to an agency.
A second alternative explanation is the presence of a moderate Republican
judge who generally sides with Democrats when given the chance.
Examination of individual decisions, however, does not support this theory. Of
all the cases in which a majority Republican panel granted deference to a
liberal agency interpretation, no specific Republican judge showed up on even
half of the panels. Moreover, the Republican who appeared most frequently on
this set of panels was Judge David Sentelle, who has a reputation for staunch
conservatism. 74 The presence of nonideological deference decisions by
majority Republican panels cannot be attributed to a closet liberal on the
circuit.
V. CONCLUSION
Partisanship clearly affects how appellate courts review agency discretion.
In our study of administrative law decisions by the D.C. Circuit, we have
found that panels controlled by Republicans were more likely to defer to
conservative agency decisions (that is, to follow the Chevron doctrine) than
were the panels controlled by Democrats. Similarly, Democrat-controlled
panels were more likely to defer to liberal agency decisions than were those
controlled by Republicans. Nonetheless, legal doctrine appears to play an
important role in the partisan struggle over policy. Minority judges can use
doctrine to corral the partisan ambitions of a court majority whose policy
preferences would best be accomplished by neglecting the dictates of doctrine.
The minority member acts as a whistleblower, ready to expose any cheating
by the majority. In our study, we found that the presence of a
74. Judge Sentelle became well known when, shortly after lunching with Senators Jesse Helms and
Lauch Faircloth of North Carolina, he replaced Whitewater special prosecutor Robert Fiskc with the
presumably more aggressive Kenneth Starr. See Sara Fritz. Starr Mixe. Ambition. Judicious Style. LA.
TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1996, at Al. The press has described Sentelle as one of the "most conservative members"
of the D.C. Circuit. E.g., Nancy Lewis, Conviction of Drug Gang Leader Upheld. WASH. POST. Apr. 29,
1995, at A18.
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whistleblower-that is, a minority member with Chevron deference favoring
the minority member's political preference-significantly increases the chances
that the court majority will follow doctrine. While a partisan split panel does
not negate all partisan influences on Chevron review, it clearly moderates such
influences and makes doctrine more likely to be followed.
